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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
EAGLE EQUITY FUND, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
TITLEONE CORPORATION, and Idaho 
corporation, ALLIANCE TITLE & ESCROW 
CORP., a Delaware corporation, DAS 
INVESTMENTS,LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, COREY BARTON 
HOMES, INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
(fka Land America Transnation, aka 
Transnation Title & Escrow, Inc.), a Delaware 
corporation, CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Nebraska or Florida 
corporation (fka Ticor Title Insurance 
Company, a California corporation), and John 
Does III-X, unknown Individuals and/or 
compames, 
Defendants. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
2 In November 2006, Eagle Equity Fund, LLC ("EEF") loaned Galiano LLC ("Galiano") 
3 the development of a parcel Kuna, known as the 
4 Galiano subdivision. (R. VoL 1, p. 2565). To secure the property, Galiano executed and recorded 
5 a Deed of Trust ("EEF Deed of Trust") naming Alliance Title ("Alliance") as trustee. (R. Vol. 1, 
6 p. 2589; Ex.Cat 2626). Also in 2006, Galiano obtained from RBC a $6 million secured 
7 financing package ("RBC Deed of Trust") for the development of the property. (R. Vol. 1, p. 
8 2660 Ex. D). EEF executed and recorded a subordination agreement putting them in second 
9 position behind the RBC Deed of Trust. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2565). 
10 The Galiano subdivision was a development project to be sold parcel by parcel. (R. Vol. 1, 
11 p. 2589). The projected revenue for the development was $6.2 million. (R. Vol. 1, p. 980 9[ 20); 
I 2 (R. Vol. I, p. 2355 9[ 7). The proceeds from the parcel sales were to be used first to pay off the 
13 RBC debt and then to pay the EEF debt. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2589). The payment schedule and cost 
14 projections are contained in the Master Credit Agreement signed by Edward Mason, manager of 
I 5 Galiano, LLC. (R. Vol. l p. 2597 Ex B). 
16 Alliance was closing agent for this entire transaction and was responsible for the 
17 safekeeping of the original documentation. (R. Vol. 1, p. 1154 9[ 3). After closing the transaction, 
18 EEF never received the original copy of the EEF Deed of Trust. (R. Vol. 1, p. l 154 9[ 7; R. Vol. I, 
19 p. 1102, I. 19). In 2008 and 2009, EEF authorized partial releases to be recorded for certain lots 
20 in the subdivision. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2565 <j[ 4, Ex. B). However, EEF never received full payment on 
21 its loan and never represented to anyone that the loan was paid-in-full. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2566 <JI 7 ). 
22 On February 11, 20 l 0, TitleOne Corporation ("TitleOne'') inexplicably recorded a full 
23 reconveyance of the EEF Deed of Trust. (R. Vol. l, p. 2415 <JI 4, Ex. A). In this document, 
24 TitleOne claimed to be the Trustee of record. Id. This reconveyance was signed by TitleOne's 
25 Heidi Emery in the performance of her job duties at TitleOne. (R. Vol. l, p. 2415, Ex. F pg. 14). 
26 The reconveyance clearly references the EEF Deed of Trust, instrument number 106181859, 
27 executed on November 17, 2006, by Galiano with EEF as the beneficiary. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2415 <JI 4, 
28 Ex. A). On this reconveyance document, TitleOne falsely states that it received "satisfactory 
evidence" of payment-in-full of the under] ying obligation. Id. Yet, TitleOne admits that they had 
no evidence payment-in-full of obligation secured by the EEF Deed of T rust. 1 (R. Vol. 1, p. 
24 F pg. 1 l never document stating that the obligation the 
4 deed of trust was satisfied. (R. VoL l, p. 1155 9f 13). EEF never executed any document releasing 
5 the Deed of Trust. Id. At this time in February 2010, approximately $4.7 million had already 
6 been spent on the acquisition and improvement of the property. (R. Vol. I, p. 2589 U 4 and 9, Ex. 
7 B). 
8 PCD, the company that TitleOne hired to prepare the reconveyance document, likely 
9 received a copy of the original EEF Deed of Trust from TitleOne, and that triggered the creation 
l O of the document. (R. . 1, p. 2415, Ex. F pg. 16-18). The original of the Deed of Trust 
11 triggered a full reconveyance of the EEF Deed of Trust by PCD. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2494). Alliance 
12 however, was unable to explain how the original Deed of Trust got into the hands of TitleOne, 
13 and hence, PCD. 
14 Vicki White, president of TitleOne, stated in deposition that an error such as a 
15 wrongful reconveyance would be elevated to legal counsel within TitleOne. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2415 
16 Ex. E pg. 38). McFadden, legal counsel for TitleOne, speaking on behalf of TitleOne in 
17 a 30(b)(6) deposition, stated that there were times where a beneficiary would need to be 
18 contacted, but TitleOne has never bothered to contact any beneficiaries. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2415 Ex. F 
19 pg. 12, I. 7-17 ). Daniel Thompson, manager of EEF, never received any communication from 
20 TitleOne informing him of the wrongful reconveyance. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2566 9f 9). In short, despite 
21 the fact that TitleOne possessed all of the evidence of a wrongful recording, TitleOne chose to 
22 ignore the problem and not inform the interested party, EEF. In filing this false reconveyance, 
23 TitleOne removed EEF from the chain of title and created the potential for a later sale by Galiano 
24 to a third party (DAS) that would ultimately strip EEF of its security interest. 
25 Subsequent to TitleOne's wrongful full reconveyance, EEF continued to execute 
26 additional partial reconveyances at the request of Galiano as lots were sold. This lead EEF to 
27 
1 TitleOne points to the fact that PCD relied on the submission of the original Deed of Trust, but 
28 TitleOne themselves had no actual evidence of payment-in-full. 
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believe that there were no problems with the existing title. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2566 <Jr 6, Ex. D). The 
2 EEF Deed of Trust, the first partial reconveyances, the full reconveyance recorded by TitleOne, 
3 and the subsequent partial reconveyances by EEF all make up the public records that were 
4 available to the subsequent titleholders or potential titleholders. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2566 U 5-6, Ex. B-
5 C). 
6 DAS, LLC ("DAS") purchased the properties from Galiano in a short sale in 2012. EEF 
7 was not provided with notice of the sale. (R. Vol. 1, p. 2566 9[ 8, Ex. A; R. Vol. 1, p. 1244 <Jr 13 ). 
8 Through a series of lot transactions with DAS that began in 2012, Corey Barton Homes, Inc. 
9 ("CBff') gained title to much of the property that made up the Galiano subdivision. (R. Vol. 1, p. 
IO 2417 qr I 4, Ex. J). DAS had signed contracts to transfer the property to CBH at a profit of over 
11 $250,000. (R. Vol. I, p. 2415 U 12-14, Ex. H-J). EEF was given no opportunity to bid on the 
12 property at the short sale or capture any of the profit immediately realized by DAS. 
13 DAS claims it had no knowledge of the full reconveyance of the EEF Deed of Trust at the 
14 time it acquired the property even though it was recorded and part of the public record. (R. Vol. 1, 
15 p. 1244 <J[ 16; R. Vol. 1, p. 2415 Ex.Band C). CBH invoked the shelter rule and claimed that it 
16 did not have any notice of EEF's claim or interest in the property ,vhen it signed the purchase 
17 agreements or when it acquired the properties, but the public records give them inquiry notice. (R. 
18 Vol. I, p. 2765 qr 10; R. Vol. 1, p. 2415 Ex.Band C). In short, both CBH and DAS wish to claim 
l 9 bona fide purchaser status, but they were on inquiry notice of EEF' s claim at those times. 
20 In early March of 2013, Daniel Thompson, manager of EEF, discovered the recording of 
21 the wrongful reconveyance. (R. Vol. L p. 862 9[ 6). He immediately took steps to protect his 
22 interest, and EEF ultimately filed suit on June 5, 2013, stating claims for, inter alia, negligence 
23 and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. (R. Vol. 1, p. 862 <JI 7). TitleOne 
24 filed a Motion to Dismiss and the District Court dismissed the common law negligence claim. (R. 
25 Vol. 1, p. 98; R. Vol. 1, p. 526). EEF amended its complaint to include a claim against TitleOne 
26 for violation of Idaho Code § 45-1205. (R. Vol. l, p. 209). The District Court held that EEF' s 
27 claim under §45-1205 was barred by the statute of limitations but allowed the claim to proceed 
28 should proof of equitable estoppel be shown. The District Court ultimately dismissed all of the 
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against TitleOne on summary judgment on September I 9, 2014, holding that EEF did not 
any damage. (R. Vol. p. 3052). The District Court summarized the undisputed facts 
rulings as follows: it 
In 2006, Edward I Mason ("Mason"), as the managing member of Galiano, LLC 
("Galiano''), approached Defendant RBC Centura Bank ("RBC") and Plaintiff 
EEF, to obtain financing to develop a 29.63 acre parcel of real property in Kuna, 
Idaho, commonly referred to as Galiano Subdivision (the "Property" or the 
"Subdivision"). The Property was ultimately platted into sixty (60) residential lots. 
On November 17, 2006, Mason, on behalf of Galiano, executed that certain Deed 
of Trust, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing and Assignment of Leases and 
Rents in favor of RBC, as beneficiary, which was recorded in the real property 
records of Ada County, Idaho on November I 7, 2006, as Instrument No. 
106181858 (the "RBC Deed of Trust"). Pursuant to its terms, the RBC Deed of 
Trust secured two promissory notes payable to RBC with an aggregate principal 
balance of $6,063,300.00: (I) an acquisition and development note in the principal 
sum of $3,413,300.00 (the "A&D Note"); and (2) a letter of credit line note in the 
principal sum of $2,650,000.00 (the "LOC Note") (the A&D Note and the LOC 
Note, collectively, the "RBC Loan"). Defendant Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. 
(" Alliance Title") was the original trustee under the RBC Deed of Trust. 
Contemporaneous with the execution of the RBC Deed of Trust, Mason, on behalf 
of Galiano, executed the Deed of Trust and Security Agreement in favor of 
Plaintiff EEF, as beneficiary, which was recorded in the real property records of 
Ada County, Idaho, on November 17, 2006, as Instrument No. 106181859 (the 
"EEF Deed of Trust"). The EEF Deed of Trust secured a promissory note payable 
to EEF \¾ith a principal balance of $725,500.00 (the ''EEF Note" or the "EEF 
Loan Defendant Alliance Title was also the original trustee under the EEF Deed 
of Trust However, Defendant Fidelity National Title Company ("Fidelity") was 
substituted in as trustee of the EEF Deed of Trust on Mav 7, 2011. Pursuant to the 
Subordination Agreement executed by RBC, Galiano, and EEF, the EEF Loan and 
Deed of Trust were junior to the RBC Loan and RBC Deed of Trust. 
On or about January 25, 2010, TitleOne received a document entitled 
"Reconveyance of Deed of Trust" from its third-party contractor/service provider, 
Post-Closing Department, Inc. ("PCD"). In 2009, TitleOne had entered into a 
service agreement with PCD, under which PCD agreed to provide services to 
facilitate the mortgage/deed of trust reconveyance process. Pursuant to that service 
agreement, PCD agreed to prepare all documents and reports and provide 
all other services necessary to effect reconveyances in compliance with the Idaho 
statutory reconveyance requirements, including providing all notices thereunder, 
tracking the reconveyance process, and recording the reconveyances. At the time 
TitleOne received the Reconveyance of Deed of Trust from PCD for the Property, 
TitleOne signed the Reconveyance and returned it to PCD. PCD, in tum, caused 
the Reconveyance to be recorded in the real property records of Ada County, 
Idaho, on February 11, 2010, as Instrument No. 110012858 (the "Reconveyance"), 
and indeed the recorder stamp reflects recording at the request of"PCD." 
According to EEF, Heidi Emery of TitleOne is the individual who signed the 
reconveyance. EEF never received any communication concerning the 
recoveyance of the EEF Deed of Trust. EEF never received satisfaction of the 
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underlying debt. EEF never communicated that the underlying debt was satisfied. 
EEF did not become aware of TitleOne's recoveyance until late February 2013. 
Beginning in 2011, Galiano was unable to maintain mortgage payments to 
Defendant RBC. On or about March 2011, Mason and Galiano told that 
had not made payments and that Defendant RBC would likely take action on the 
Property. On May 17, 2012, Galiano executed a General Warranty Deed 
conveying the balance of the lots it owned in the Subdivision to DAS Investments, 
LLC ("DAS"). On November 1, 2012, Defendant RBC, as plaintiff, and Galiano, 
Ted Mason Signature Homes, Inc., and Edward and Sherry Mason, entered into a 
Stipulated Judgment, agreeing to a judgment in favor of RBC and against those 
defendants in the principal amount of $2,601,541.37, plus costs, fees, and interest 
as more specifically set forth therein. 
EEF commenced this action against defendants Alliance Title, TitleOne, Fidelity, 
RBC, and Chicago Title on June 5, 2013. EEF filed its First Amended Complaint 
against the originally named Defendants and several other additional Defendants 
on December 9, 2013. 
(R. Vol. I, pg. 1056-8). 
Shortly after the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of TitleOne, CBH 
moved for summary judgment, and EEF filed a Motion to Amend to include a claim for quiet title. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 2759; R. Vol. 1, p. 2742). The District Court denied EEF's Motion to Amend while 
granting CB ff s judgment. (R. Vol. 1, 3120). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
L Under Idaho statutory law, which requires proof of damage to maintain a claim under LC. 
§ 45-1205, did the District Court err in holding that EEF' s loss of its right to participate in 
the short sale to protect its security interest was insufficient to constitute "damages"? 
II. Under Idaho common law, which requires proof of damage to maintain a claim for 
Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, did the District Court err in 
holding that the Appellant's loss of its right to participate in the short sale to protect its 
security interest was insufficient to constitute "damages"? 
III. Under Idaho Statutory Law, which puts a 20-year statute of limitations on property title 
actions and a 4-year limitation on non-injury torts, did the District Court err by dismissing 
EEF' s I.C. § 45-1205 claim against TitleOne by applying a 3-year limit? 
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3 
IV. 
4 V. 
5 
6 
7 
Idaho law, which allows recovery for monetary loss for negligent rendition of 
services. did the District Court err by dismissing EEF' s common law negligence claim 
TitleOne pursuant to the Economic Loss Doctrine? 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow for liberal grants of leave to 
amend the pleadings, did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying EEF's request 
to add a meritorious cause of action for quiet title? 
8 ARGUMENT 
9 EEF was the beneficiary of a Deed of Trust securing its interest in the real property known 
IO as the Galiano Subdivision in Kuna, ID. Through no fault of its own, EEF was stripped of that 
11 interest EEF made several claims against TitleOne under a variety of theories including 
12 Violation of LC § 45-1205, Common Law Negligence, and Tortious Interference with 
13 Prospective Economic Advantage ("TIPEA"). TitleOne should be held to account for its 
14 wrongful reconveyance of EEF' s Deed of Trust and resulting damage. 
15 In dismissing s claims for Violation of LC § 45-1205 and TlPEA against TitleOne, 
16 the District Court held that EEF suffered no damage as a result of TitleOne' s wrongful 
17 reconveyance of EEFs Deed of Trust The District Court erred in concluding that EEF suffered 
18 no damage because (1) EEF was denied its right to participate in the short sale to protect its 
19 security interest; (2) the District Court ignored the fact that the subsequent sale by DAS to CBH 
20 resulted in an immediate turnaround profit of $270,000 to DAS and (3) the District Court failed to 
21 draw a reasonable inference of market value in favor of EEF, instead drawing it in favor of 
22 TitleOne. 
23 The District Court further held that EEF' s cause of action for Violation of LC § 45-1205 
24 against TitleOne was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In reaching this conclusion, 
25 the District Court determined that the date of accrual of the claim was the date that TitleOne 
26 wrongfully reconveyed EEF's Deed of Trust. The District Court erred in holding the applicable 
27 statute of limitation to be 3 years because ( 1) EEF' s cause of action had not yet accrued in 
28 February of 2010 and (2) the applicable statute should actually be the more appropriate 4-year 
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"catch all" limit or the titleholder's 20-year statute. 
2 EEF' s claim for common law negligence against TitleOne was dismissed because the 
3 District Court held that damages were barred under the economic loss doctrine. The District 
4 Court erred by applying the economic loss doctrine to damages that were a direct result of the 
5 negligent services provided by TitleOne. 
6 EEF made a Motion to Amend its complaint to include a claim for quiet title against CBH. 
7 The District Court refused to allow amendment of the pleadings to include this claim because it 
8 concluded that the claim had no merit. The District Court erred in denying this motion because a 
9 claim for quiet title is meritorious and the Court abused its discretion in denying the inclusion of a 
10 meritorious claim. 
11 
12 I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
13 This Court exercises de novo review of a grant of summary judgment, using the same 
14 standard as is used by the district court ruling on the motion. Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase 
15 Home fln., LLC, 152 Idaho 927,929,277 P.3d 374,376 (2012). Summary judgment is proper 
16 "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
17 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
18 judgment as a matter of law." Teurlings v. Larson 156 Idaho 65, 69,320 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2014) 
19 (citation omitted) (quoting Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 56(c)). The Court construes 
20 all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, "and all reasonable inferences that can be 
21 drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Fuller v. Callister, 150 
22 Idaho 848,851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) (quoting Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 
23 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010)). "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then 
24 only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." 
25 The trial court's decision to deny a motion to amend a pleading is discretionary. Trimble v. 
26 Engelking, 130 Idaho 300,303,939 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1997) (citing Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 
27 606,610,570 P.2d 284,288 (1977.)) This Court uses a three factor test to determine whether the 
28 trial court abused its discretion. The inquiry is: (I) whether the trial court correctly perceived the 
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I issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
2 discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
3 it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Ramos v. Dixon, 
4 144 Idaho 32, 35, 156 P.3d 533, 536 (2007). 
5 II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING EEF'S CAUSE OF ACTION 
6 AGAINST TITLEONE FOR VIOLATION OF LC. §45-1205 ON THE BASIS THAT 
7 APPELLANT SUFFERED NO DAMAGES 
8 The District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to TitleOne on EEF's cause 
9 of action under I.C. §45-1205. I.C. §45-1205 creates liability for damages suffered upon the 
10 negligent reconveyance of a trust deed by a title agent or insurer. The District Court concluded 
11 that EEF did not present sufficient evidence that it suffered damages as a result of TitleOne' s 
12 negligent reconveyance of EEF's deed of trust. (R. Vol. L p. 3061.) This reasoning is flawed 
13 based on the fact that EEF was in fact damaged when it was deprived of any notice to participate 
14 in the short sale of the property and protect its security interest. Evidence in the record further 
15 supports that EEF suffered damage by loss of potential profit when Galiano sold the property to 
16 DAS for $860,000, who then turned around and sold the property to Corey Barton Homes for 
17 $1.13 million, collecting a gross profit of $270,000. Had EEF been granted its rights to 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
participate in the short sale, it would have been allowed to purchase the deed of trust outright, and 
either sell it for profit ( as DAS did), or wait for the market to recuperate and potentially collect 
the entirety of its security interest. 
A. EEF Was Damaged When Its Rights Were Stripped Through TitleOne's 
Violation Of LC.§ 45-1205 
EEF was not afforded an opportunity to participate in the short sale of the property for 
which it held a lien interest. The fact that EEF was not notified of the short sale is not in dispute. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 3061.) Neither is the fact that EEF was not allowed to participate in the short sale. 
Had EEF's Deed of Trust not been wrongfully reconveyed back to Galiano, EEF would have held 
a junior lien that required satisfaction in some manner in order for DAS to receive clean title to 
the property. Despite these facts, the District Court concluded that EEF suffered no damages. (R. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 8 -
Vol. I, p. 3061.) The basis for the Court's conclusion was that at the time of the sale, EEF' s 
2 second-position deed of trust "had no discernable value." (R., Vol. 1, p. 3824.) However, the 
3 complete lack of notice and participation in the sale barred any opportunity EEF had to recoup the 
4 value of its investment or protect its security interest by purchasing the first lien at the price DAS 
5 paid ... $860,000. An investment by EEF of an additional $860,000 to acquire the first Deed of 
6 Trust would have placed EEF in first position at a total cost of $1.61 million on a property that 
7 had $4.7 million already invested in it for acquisition and development. EEF would be selling 
8 lots at this time instead of CBH. 
9 It is also true that DAS quickly resold the property to CBH and realized a significant 
10 profit. This profit could have been earned by EEF just as easily so the Court's conclusion that 
11 EEF suffered no damage is not supported by the facts. 
12 "The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured but that its injury 
13 was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount and causation must be proven with 
14 reasonable certainty." Gr(ffzth v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 
15 611 (2007 ). "Reasonable certainty" does not mean that damages need to be proven with 
16 "mathematical exactitude," but it does require a plaintiff to prove that damages are not merely 
17 speculative. Id. Ultimately it is for the trier of fact to fix the amount by determining the 
18 credibility of the witnesses, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and drawing reasonable 
19 inferences therefrom. Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 774, 774, 118 P.3d 106 (2005). 
20 EEF held a junior deed of trust to the property in question as security for the $725,500 
21 loan it made to Galiano. (R. Vol.l, p. 3053.) As such, EEF was a record lien holder and should 
22 have been provided notice of the short sale. No such notice was given. It is unclear why EEF 
23 was not given any notice of the sale. A reasonable inference can be made, however, it was 
24 because TitleOne had negligently reconveyed EEF's deed of trust prior to the date of the sale, and 
25 no deed or lien appeared on record. In any event, LC. §45-1205 does not require the damage be 
26 caused by any particular party, including the one accused of negligent reconveyance. It simply 
27 provides that the party accused of negligent reconveyance is liable for the damages suffered as a 
28 result of the improper reconveyance. Id. Thus, regardless of how or why EEF was not provided 
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notice, the fact that no notice was provided to EEF allowed the short sale to go forward with no 
consideration of EEF s junior lien. In fact, the District Court itself acknowledged that EEF' s 
rights were ,vrn,,__,u its Memorandum Order dated , 2015, 
4 District Court stated: reconveyance of its deed trust was an invasion of [EEF' s] rights. " 
5 (R. Vol. l, p. 3824.) 
6 Thus, EEF was damaged when its junior lien was stripped through the short sale by 
7 Galiano to DAS. It was the lack of notice coupled with the loss of opportunity to participate in 
8 the short sale which ultimately proves EEF's damages theory "beyond mere speculation." 
9 B. EEF \Vas Injured \Vhen It \Vas Denied The Right To Participate In The 
10 Short Sale, And Its Measure of Damage Exceeds Mere Speculation, As 
11 Evidenced By DAS's $270,000 Gross Profit \Vhen It Immediately Sold to 
12 Corey Barton Homes 
l 3 As described above, EEF was denied the right to participate in the short sale of the 
14 property for which it held a lien interest due to TitleOne' s wrongful reconveyance. According to 
15 the District Court, however, EEF' s inability to participate in the sale and the loss of its lien 
16 interest was not sufficient evidence of damages. Again, the Court pointed to the depreciation in 
l 7 value of EEF's deed of trust as evidence of EEF's lack of injury. (R., Vol. l, p. 3824.) 
18 However, if EEF were able to participate in the sale, it would have had the opportunity to recoup 
19 at least part of its investment. EEF never received that opportunity. 
20 As a result of the short sale, Galiano sold the property to DAS Investments for $860,000. 
21 (R. Vol. 1, p. 2566 ~ 8, Ex. A; R. Vol. 1, p. 1244 ~ 13). DAS then promptly turned around and 
22 sold off the property to Corey Barton Homes for $ l .13 million. Id. Thus, DAS purchased the 
23 property for $860,000 and sold it for $1.13 million, collecting a gross profit of $270,000. The 
24 District Court maintained that EEF suffered no injury because RBC could not have recouped its 
25 investment as the first-position lien holder, and thus, EEF' s second-position deed held no 
26 discernable value. (R., Vol. 1, p. 3824.) However, this position entirely disregards the 
27 possibility that EEF could have taken action at the short sale if it were allowed to participate. To 
28 this point, the District Court reasoned in its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
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Defendant TitleOne Corporation's Second Motion for Summary Judgment that for EEF to prove 
2 damages in this regard, it would have had to put forth evidence probative of the price it would 
3 have paid for the property at the short sale. (R., Vol. L p. 3060.) It then speculated that such a 
4 price would "presumably [be] more than DAS paid for it, as a competition between DAS and EEF 
5 for the property probably would have driven up the price." Id. This was a question of fact that 
6 was not appropriately resolved through summary judgment. 
7 As Idaho law requires with regard to proving damages, amount and causation must be 
8 proven with reasonable certainty. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 
9 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007). "Reasonable certainty" does not mean that damages need to be proven 
IO with "mathematical exactitude," but it does require a plaintiff to prove that damages are not 
11 merely speculative. Id. While it may be true that the price EEF would have paid could have 
12 been higher than what DAS paid, that amount, $860,000, presents at least a figure that is more 
13 than mere "speculation.'' Additionally, the gross profit that DAS made on the sale to Corey 
14 Barton represents a figure of damages that is more than mere "speculation'' as well. In fact, it 
15 represents potentially the lowest figure that EEF would have obtained, as it could have assumed 
16 first lien position and sold the property at a later date, for a higher amount. In any event, while it 
17 is impossible to prove with "mathematical exactitude" the measure of damage that EEF sustained 
I 8 as a result of TitleOne' s wrongful recon veyance of its deed of trust, the sale of the property by 
19 DAS to CBH is evidence that exceeds mere speculation. The exact amount should be determined 
20 by a jury upon the consideration of evidence and credibility of witnesses as required by Sells. 
21 EEF was damaged when its lien rights were stripped through the short sale. This was the 
22 direct result of TitleOne's negligent reconveyance of its deed of trust. In addition, DAS's sale of 
23 the property for a profit of $270,000 presents a reasonable amount of damages that EEF 
24 sustained. Thus, the cause and amount of EEF's damages can be proven beyond mere 
25 speculation, and summary judgment was not appropriate with regard to EEF' s cause of action 
26 under I.C. §45-1205. 
27 In addition, the District Court drew an inference of 2012 market value for the Galiano 
28 subdivision that was in favor of TitleOne and detrimental to EEF. Summary judgment standard 
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requires that EEF receive the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Thus, the District Court erred 
2 by refusing to infer a that was more commensurate with the expenditures and costs of the 
Rather, Court that the sale value 2012 was market 
4 of the property in 2010. Thus, the District Court misapplied the standards summary judgment 
5 to the issue of damages. 
6 
7 III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR 
8 TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADV ANT AGE 
9 AGAINST TITLEONE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ON THE BASIS THAT 
IO WITHOUT A DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES, APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF 
11 ACTION COULD NOT LIE. 
12 In dismissing EEF' s cause of action for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic 
13 Advantage, the District Court employed the same reasoning as it did in dismissing EEF s claim 
14 under LC. §45-1205. In sum. the Court concluded that EEF did not introduce "competent 
15 evidence of damages. (R., Vol. 1, p. 3057.) This reasoning is incorrect based on the fact that 
I 6 EEF suffered damages in the lack of notice and opportunity to participate in the short sale, and 
17 the deprivation of its ability to recoup some or all of its investment. As EEF's proof of damages 
18 was discussed at length in the preceding section, it will not be reiterated here. 
19 With regard to tortious interference claim, 5 elements must be proven. Those elements 
20 are: ( l) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the 
21 part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; ( 4) the 
22 interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the 
23 defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5) resulting damage to the 
24 plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 
25 330, 338 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (Idaho 1999.) 
26 The District Court dismissed EEF' s tortious interference claim based on one solitary 
27 issue; that EEF failed to prove sufficient damages. As damages are an essential element of any 
28 tortious interference claim, such was dispositive. Id. The District Court erred in dismissing the 
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claim on this basis because, as previously discussed, EEF suffered damages as a result of 
2 TitleOne's negligent reconveyance, and of which the amount can be proven beyond mere 
3 speculation. Specifically, the resale of the property for a $270,000 profit by DAS immediately 
4 after the short sale represents a reasonable figure to present to a jury. As such, summary 
5 judgment was not appropriate on this issue. 
6 
7 IV. THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO 
8 EAGLE EQUITY FUND'S CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF I.C. § 45-1205 AGAINST 
9 TITLEONE 
IO The issue of the statute of limitations comes before this Court as a matter of first 
11 impression concerning EEF' s claim for violation of J.C. § 45-1205 against TitleOne. This is a 
12 claim that arises out of the title to the Galiano Subdivision, but the claim is also a tort. The 
13 District Court was faced with a choice between three different statutes of limitations: (l) a four-
14 year period under Idaho Code § 5-224 (2); a twenty-year period under Idaho Code § 5-204, (2), 
15 and (3) a three-year period under Idaho Code § 5-218( I). The District Court erred in determining 
16 the accrual date of the cause of action and misapplied LC. § 5-218( 1) 3-year limit reserved for 
l 7 purely statutory causes of action. See page 26 of its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
18 Various Motions entered on February 26, 2014. 
19 In convincing the District Court to rule as it did, TitleOne argued that Idaho Code §5-
20 218(1) was the applicable statute of limitations because it should cover all statutory liabilities. It 
21 reads in part "[Within three (3) years:] An action upon liability created by statute, other than a 
22 penalty or forfeiture:· Idaho Code § 5-218(1 ). TitleOne argued, and is expected to argue on 
23 appeal, that I.C. § 45-1205 is a "liability created by statute" because it's a liability depending for 
24 its existence on the enactment of a statute. See Dietrich v. Copeland Lumber Co., 28 Idaho 312 
25 (l 916 ). TitleOne' s argument and the District Court's holding fail because Idaho Code §45-1205 
26 liability is actually a codified tort, and tort law stands independent of the existence of any statute. 
27 Idaho Code §45-1205 has never been litigated. However, other codified tort law has been 
28 litigated, and a four-year limit has always been applied. Therefore, EEF respectfully requests that 
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this Court reverse the District Court's error and apply the more applicable 20-year or 4-year 
statute 
A. The District Court Erred In Its Determination Of The Accrual Date Of EEF' s 
Cause Of Action Against TitleOne For Violation Of Idaho Code§ 45-1205 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order on Various Motions filed on February 26, 2014, 
the District Court dismissed EEF' s cause of action against TitleOne for the violation of Idaho 
Code §45-1205 on the basis that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
The Court applied the three-year limitations period set forth in Idaho Code §5-218( l ). In its 
application of the statute of limitations, the Court held that EEF' s cause of action under Idaho 
Code §45-1205 accrued and the statute began to run no later than February 11, 2010, which was 
the date the reconveyance was recorded by TitleOne. 
The Court acknowledged that the following facts were undisputed for purposes of its 
summary judgment ( l) EEF never received any communication regarding the 
reconveyance of the Deed of Trust; (2) EEF never received satisfaction of the underlying 
debt; (3) EEF never communicated that the underlying debt was satisfied; and (4) EEF did not 
become aware of TitleOne' s reconveyance until late February 2013. In short the undisputed 
facts established a violation of Idaho Code §45-1205 by TitleOne. EEF filed suit on June 5, 
2013, just three months after becoming aware of the claim. 
It is submitted that the Court erred in its determination of the date of accrual of EEF' s 
§45-1205 cause of action. The Court held that the cause of action accrued and the statute of 
limitations commenced running at the time of the reconveyance which was recorded on February 
11, 2010. Three years from that date would be February 11, 2013. EEF did not learn of the 
wrongful reconveyance until late February 2013. In effect, EEF's claim had become time-barred 
before EEF even knew of its existence. This result is patently unfair and contrary to concepts of 
fundamental justice. 
Moreover, EEF was not damaged by the wrongful reconveyance until May 12, 2012, 
when Galiano sold the property to DAS without notice to EEF thereby stripping EEF of its lien 
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l rights. Prior to the sale, the wrongful reconveyance could have been corrected with no harm 
2 being suffered by EEF had EEF been aware of it. It was the sale and loss of lien rights (damages) 
3 that completed EEF's cause of action and triggered the running of the statute of limitations. The 
4 accrual date should therefore be May 12, 2012, the date of the sale to DAS by Galiano. With this 
5 accrual date, the EEF §45-1205 cause of action would be timely. 
6 While it appears that the issue of determining the accrual date for a cause of action 
7 brought under §45-1205 against a trustee has not been litigated before, there are analogous 
8 situations that provide useful guidance. Streib v Veigel, l 09 Idaho 174 ( 1985) involved a claim 
9 for professional negligence brought against an accountant in connection with the preparation of 
10 several tax returns. The last return was filed in 1980. The IRS audited the returns in 1982 and 
11 denied certain deductions assessing penalties and interest. The lawsuit was filed in April of 1983. 
12 The accountant contended that the two-year statute of limitations commenced running at the time 
I 3 of preparation and filing of the tax returns, the last of which was in 1980. The trial court agreed 
14 and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the trial 
15 court on the basis that "some damage" did not occur until the IRS audited the returns in 1982 
16 which is when the statute of limitations commenced running. 
l 7 In reaching its conclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court found the reasoning of the Texas 
18 Supreme Court in Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967) to be persuasive quoting the 
19 following language: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
"The general rule is that a cause of action sounding in tort 
accrues, in the absence of a statute to the contrary or fraudulent 
concealment, when the tort is committed. This rule obtains 
notwithstanding the fact that the damages, or their extent, are not 
ascertainable until a later date. [Citations.] 
* * * * * * 
"Turning from general principles to the facts involved in the 
instant case, we have concluded that the plaintiffs cause of action did 
not arise until the tax deficiency was assessed by the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue. Prior to assessment the plaintiff had not been 
injured. That is, assessment was the factor essential to consummate 
the wrong only then was the tort complained of completed. If a 
deficiency had never been assessed, the plaintiff would not have been 
harmed and therefore would have had no cause of action .... In short, 
in the absence of assessment, injury would not have inevitably 
resulted." Streib, id. at 177. 
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Idaho Supreme Court went on to hold that "the tortious negligence is continuing in 
nature suffer the ordinary course preparation and 
4 submission of income tax returns contemplate a review by the Internal Revenue Service, with 
5 damages resulting at that time if the returns have been erroneously prepared." Streib at 179. 
6 Similar reasoning applies in this case. The act of recording the reconveyance, in and of itself, 
7 caused no harm. It was the negligent act that was continuing in nature. A corrective deed of trust 
8 could have been recorded to restore EEF' s lien rights. Had that been done, then EEF would not 
9 have been damaged and no claim would be available to assert against TitleOne just as no claim 
10 for negligence could be asserted against the accountant if the IRS elected not to audit the returns. 
11 It was not until Galiano sold the property to DAS thereby stripping EEF of its lien rights that 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
"some damage" actually occurred. At that time, the tort was complete and the statute of 
limitations commenced running. 
The Streib case 1s also significant for the concurring opinion by Justice Bistline where he 
stated the following addressing the "some damage" rule: 
I concur in the result A better ground upon which to base 
this result, however, is art. I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution. This 
section declares that: "Courts of justice shall be open to every 
person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, 
property, or character, and right and justice shall be administered 
without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." (Emphasis added.) 
As I stated in Theriault v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 
, 371 ( 1985) (Bistline, J ., dissenting), art. I, § 18 
does not invalidate statutes of limitations per se. It does, however, 
require that "people be granted a reasonable opportunity to seek 
redress through this state's court system." 
In Theriault, I quoted the language of Justice Shepard and 
Chief Justice Donaldson, as recorded in Renner v. Edwards, 
..... .. 17 ~ .. I) } ( 1970), in which they declared that 
allowing a statute of limitations to cut off a person's cause of action 
before he or she knew, or had a reasonable opportunity to learn of 
it, would be "manifestly unjust," "palpably unjust," "patently 
inane," "inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice," and 
"manifestly inconsistent and unfair." Theriault, supra, 108 Idaho at 
309-10, 698 P.2d at 371-72, quoting Renner, supra at 839, 842-43, 
475 P.2d at 533, 536-37. Accordingly, these two Justices, joined by 
Justice McQuade, held that the forerunner of today's I.C. § 5-219(4) 
does not begin to run until a person knows or has had a reasonable 
opportunity to learn of his or her cause of action. Renner, supra, at 
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838, 475 P.2d at 532. 
Here, EEF was not even aware of the wrongful reconveyance until after the statute of 
limitations had run if one applies the accrual date utilized by the trial court in granting summary 
judgment to TitleOne. To allow the statute of limitations to cut off EEFs §45-1205 cause of 
action before EEF was even aware of it is manifestly unjust and should not stand. The principals 
underlying the "some damage" rule apply equally here as well and they are consistent with the 
concept that all of the elements of a cause of action need to be present before a lawsuit can be 
filed. The foregoing is also consistent with Idaho Code Section 5-201 which states that civil 
actions can only be commenced after the cause o{ action shall have accrued. To give meaning to 
this section and the axiom that a party has no right to sue for damages until actual injury occurs 
requires a determination that the three-year statute of limitations applied by the Court in this case 
did not commence running until the last elements of the claim had been satisfied, i.e. that 
damages were incurred by EEF as a result of TitleOne's violation of Idaho Code §45-1205. 
B. Codified Non-Injury Torts Have A Four-Year Statute Of Limitations 
Non-injury tort claims such as nuisance typically have a 4-year statute of limitations under 
Idaho Code §5-224, which reads "[a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be 
commenced within four( 4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued." At a minimum, the 
LC. §5-224 4-year statute of limitations for various tort actions should apply to a statutory 
negligence claim such as LC. §45-1205. After all, even common law negligence that does not 
involve personal injury or malpractice is subject to the 4-year statute of limitations under LC. § 5-
224. Hoglan v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 120 Idaho 682 ( 1991 ). 
Nuisance is also an example of a codified non-injury tort. "A nuisance signified not 
merely an infringement of property rights, but a wrong against both person and property - a 
tort." Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 105 Idaho 320 (Idaho App. 1983) (emphasis 
added). And such tort is codified as "an action'' where the injurious behavior "may be enjoined 
or abated" as well as "damages recovered." Idaho Code § 52-111 (emphasis added). Although 
nuisance is a tort and has been codified by Idaho Code § 52-10 l et seq, it is well settled in Idaho 
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that the statute of limitations provided for by Section 5-224 applies to such statutory 
2 nuisance actions. See Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 766 
3 1 
4 It stands to reason that other codified torts should also have the same statute of I imitations 
5 as common law negligence and statutory nuisance. After all, nuisance is a common law cause of 
6 action that has found way into Idaho Code §52-10 l et seq and has a 4-year statute of limitation 
7 under J.C. §5-224. Similarly, trustee negligence has been codified in Idaho Code §45-1205. Why 
8 should trustee negligence be treated differently? Indeed, it should receive at least a four-year 
9 limit like any other non-injury tort claim. 
10 In the alternative to applying the 20-year limit under LC. § 5-204, this Court should hold 
11 that the catch-all statute of limitation in LC. § 5-224 applies to any negligence action brought 
12 under I.C. § 45-1205. EEF respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's 
l 3 application of a three-year statute of limitation. 
14 C. An I.C. § 45-1205 Claim Necessarily Arises Out Of Title To Real Property 
15 In Idaho, actions arising out of title to real property have a different statute of limitations 
16 than other claims. Idaho Code § 5-204 provides: 
17 
18 
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No cause of action, or defense to an action, arising out of the 
title to real property, or to rents or profits out of th~ same, can 
be effectual unless it appears that the person prosecuting the 
action, or making the defense, or under whose title the action is 
prosecuted or the defense is made, or the ancestor, predecessor 
or grantor, of such person, was seized or possessed of the 
premises in question within twenty (20) years before the 
commencement of the act in respect to which such action is 
prosecuted or defense made. Idaho Code§ 5-204. 
EEF s I.C. § 45-1205 claim against TitleOne is clearly "arising out of the title to real 
property" because it arises out of TitleOne's wrongful reconveyance of the Plaintiff's deed of 
trust that, until 2010, was on the title of the Galiano Subdivision. Because the wording of Idaho 
Code § 5-204 is sufficiently broad to include any action "arising out of'' the title to real property, 
the Court should conclude that 5-204 was intended to apply to a 45-1205 claim and reverse the 
District Court. Under this plain language of LC. § 5-204, the Court should reverse and apply a 
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l 20-year limit for actions arising out of title. 
2 V. THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE \VHEN 
IT DISMISSED EEF'S COMMON LA \V NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
4 The Economic Loss Doctrine was originally created as part of products liability law. 
5 However, this is a case involving the negligent rendition of services. Failing to recognize this 
6 difference, the District Court applied the Economic Loss Doctrine and reached an untenable 
7 result. Even if the District Court had reason to apply the doctrine, TitleOne falls within the 
8 exception to the rule. 
9 A. Economic Loss Doctrine Defines The Scope Of A Defendant's Duty, And Titleone 
l O Clearly Owed A Duty To Eagle Equity Fund 
11 In January of 2014, the District Court was asked to grant summary judgment on EEF's 
12 common law negligence claim against TitleOne. In making this request, counsel for TitleOne 
13 represented to the District Court that the damages suffered by EEF were economic in nature and 
14 thus were precluded by the economic loss doctrine. 
15 However, TitleOne's argument preyed upon the most common misconception regarding 
16 the economic loss doctrine. In its argument to the District Court, TitleOne presented case law 
17 that related to product liability, not the service liability that was at issue in this case. In 2010, this 
18 Court addressed the topic of economic loss doctrine as applied to a service negligence scenario, 
19 yet it was that decision in 2010 that was disregarded by the District Court. 
20 The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine of modern products liability law. 
21 Brian and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 25 (2010). However, this rule 
22 applies to negligence cases in general, and its application is not restricted to products liability 
23 cases. Id at 26. 
24 Often misunderstood, economic loss "is not simply damages that can be measured 
25 monetarily." Id at 27. Actually, the economic loss rule "does not limit the damages recoverable 
26 in a negligence action." Id at 28. Rather, the economic loss rule just places limits on the actor's 
27 duty so that there is no cause of action for negligence. Id at 28. 
28 "Every person has a general duty to use ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury 
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to others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, 
2 render services, or use his property as to avoid such injury." Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188 
3 (1966 ). "In circumstances involving the rendition of personal services, the duty upon the actor is 
4 to perform the services in a workmanlike manner." H(r/fman v. Sirnplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 
5 32, 37 (1975). If the actor negligently damages another's property in performing those services, 
6 the actor is liable for such damage. S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godmcm, 95 Idaho 614 ( 1973 ). 
7 Cases where the plaintiff seeks recovery for purely economic losses without alleging any 
8 attending personal injury or property damages must be distinguished from cases involving the 
9 recovery of economic losses which are parasitic to an injury to person or property. Just 's, Inc. v. 
l O Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462 footnote 1 ( 1978). "It is well established that in the latter 
11 case economic losses are recoverable in a negligence action." Id (emphasis added). 
12 In Brian and Christie, Inc., the court was faced with a situation where a contractor did a 
13 shoddy job at installing wiring in a Taco Time restaurant. As a result of the contractor's shoddy 
14 wiring job, the restaurant was damaged substantially from an electrical fire. The district court in 
15 Brian and Christie ruled in favor of the defendants because it wrongly applied the definition of 
16 economic loss as it relates to the purchase of defective property. Brian and Christie at 27. This 
17 Court explained the court's holding: the definition of economic loss stated in Salmon Rivers, and 
18 utilized in Tusch, Duffin, Ramerth, Blahd, and Aardema does not apply in cases involving the 
19 negligent rendition of services, because such cases do not involve the purchase of defective 
20 property. Id. 
21 This Court described the situation well when it said 'Taco Time did not contend that it 
22 suffered economic loss because Subcontractor sold it a defective restaurant." Brian and Christie 
23 at 26. "The restaurant was not defective property. It did not spontaneously combust." Id. 
24 In this case, TitleOne convinced the District Court to do exactly what the District Court in 
25 Brian and Christie did. TitleOne convinced the District Court to use the reasoning in Duflin v. 
26 Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 1002 ( 1995). In Duffin, losses suffered as a result of 
27 defective potato seeds were deemed to be purely economic in nature and thus unrecoverable 
28 under the theory of negligence. However, Duffin is entirely distinguishable from Brian and 
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Christie and the instant case because Duffin involved a defective product. Both Brian and 
2 Christie and the instant case involve negligent rendition of services. By applying the reasoning of 
3 Duffin to a services case such as this, the District Court did exactly what this Court condemned in 
4 Brian and Christie. 
5 This case, just like Brian and Christie, does not concern defective property. EEF's deed 
6 of trust was not defective. It was the negligent service of TitleOne that caused the loss of EEF' s 
7 property interest. Such losses are recoverable in a negligence action because this is a case about 
8 negligent actions that caused damage to property. See lust's Inc. fn 1. Just because the damage 
9 can be measured monetarily, does not mean that the economic loss doctrine prohibits it. 
IO EEF is asking to be compensated for the value of its deed of trust that TitleOne destroyed. 
1 1 These damages are well within the scope of the duty owed by TitleOne. The District Court erred 
12 in applying the economic loss doctrine to this scenario. EEF requests that this Court reverse this 
13 decision and remand this case to the District Court where EEF s common law negligence claim 
14 may proceed. 
15 B. Titleone Has A "Special Relationship" With EEF 
16 Idaho courts have acknowledged a "special relationship" exception to the economic loss 
17 rule. "An exception to the economic loss rule is applicable in cases involving a "special 
18 relationship" between the parties." lust's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 
19 997 (1978). "We have held that a party generally owes no duty to exercise due care to avoid 
20 purely economic loss." E.g., Clark at 336, 581 P.2d at 794. The term "special relationship," 
21 therefore, refers to those situations where the relationship between the parties is such that it would 
22 be equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there is an extremely limited group of cases 
23 where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's economic interest. Duffin v. Iclaho 
24 Crop Imp.Ass'n, 895 P.2d 1195, 126 Idaho 1002 (Idaho 1995 ). Such an example recognized by 
25 the Idaho Supreme Court was the relationship between an insurance agent and the insured. In 
26 applying the special relationship exception, the Court emphasized the fact that an insurance agent 
27 holds himself out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and that, by 
28 so doing, the agent induces reliance on his superior knowledge and skill. McAlvain v. General 
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Ins. of America, 97 Idaho at 780, 554 P.2d at 958. 
2 However, the special relationship exception is not limited to the "professional" 
3 as the insured/insurance agent relationship in McA!vain. Duffin, because 
4 seed company (ICIA) was the only company in the state that could certify seed potatoes, it knew 
5 that one could sell the certified seeds at a higher price. ICIA even marketed itself based on that 
6 fact. The very purpose of such marketing was to induce reliance by purchasers on the fact that 
7 seed has been certified. "Under such circumstances, ICIA occupies a special relationship with 
8 those whose reliance it has knowingly induced. "Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp.Ass'n, 895 P.2d 1195, 
9 126 Idaho 1002 (Idaho 1995). 
l O The most recent Idaho Supreme Court case to address this exception was Aardema v. U.S. 
11 Dairy Systems, Inc., 215 P.3d 505, 147 Idaho 785 (Idaho 2009). This case dealt with a Plaintiff 
I 2 that contracted with the Defendant to install and maintain a milking system for their dairy. 
13 Plaintiffs alleged negligent design, installation and maintenance of the milking system which 
14 resulted in decreased milk production, quality and damage to the cows. That opinion synthesized 
15 the exception into two situations in which a "special relationship" exists. The Court stated: 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
A special relationship exists where the relationship between the 
parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a 
duty." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. The special 
relationship exception to the economic loss rule is an extremely 
narrow exception which applies in only limited circumstances. 
This Court has found a special relationship to exist in only two 
situations, (1) " where a professional or quasi-professional 
performs personal services [; ]" and (2) " where an entity holds 
itself out to the public as having expertise regarding a 
specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces 
reliance on its performance of that function." Blahd, 141 Idaho 
at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001; see McA/vain v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 
97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976); see also Duffin, 
126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
TitleOne performs both personal services and it holds itself out as having expertise 
regarding a specialized function ... reeonveyancing of title as a trustee. When doing a 
reeonveyance, TitleOne is required to follow the statutory requirements of Idaho Code §45-1203 
which is a specialized function. The public relies on title companies to follow the statutory 
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requirements. Thus, a special relationship exists between title companies and any holder of a 
2 deed of trust. As such, equity demands that a duty be imposed on title companies, and fault 
3 should lie under a theory of negligence where a title company such as TitleOne breaches its duty. 
4 
5 VI. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO ALLO\V AMENDMENT TO INCLUDE A 
6 MERITORIOUS QUIET TITLE CLAIM 
7 Although amendments to the pleadings are to be liberally granted, the District Court 
8 decided to disallow amendment by incorrectly analyzing EEF's proposed quiet title claim. EEF 
9 requested permission to amend the pleadings to include a claim for quiet title against the current 
IO titleholder, Corey Barton Homes, Inc. ("CBH"). In this quiet title claim, EEF sought to assert 
11 that CBH was on inquiry notice of the existence of EEF' s deed of trust and that equity demanded 
I 2 that the property still be subject to that deed of trust. The District Court incorrectly concluded 
13 that CBH did not have inquiry notice of EEF' s deed of trust and thus denied EEF' s Motion to 
14 Amend. 
15 A. CBH Had Inquiry Notice Of EEF's Deed Of Trust When It Took Title To The 
16 Galiano Property. 
17 In Idaho, buyers are on notice of facts that can be discovered through an inquiry. It has 
18 long been established that a purchaser is charged with every fact shown by the records and is 
19 presumed to know every other fact which an examination suggested by the records would have 
20 disclosed. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195 (200 I) (citing Cordova v. Hood, 84 U.S. l 
21 (1873) and Northwestern Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620 (1898)). One claiming title to lands is 
22 chargeable with notice of every matter affecting the estate, ,vhich appears on the face of any 
23 recorded deed forming an essential link in his chain of title, and also with notice of such matters 
24 as might be learned by inquiry which the recitals in such instruments made it a duty to pursue. Id 
25 at 196 (citing Glover v. Brown, 32 Idaho 426 (1919)). In addition to giving notice to others that 
26 an interest is claimed in real property, the recording statutes give protection against bona fide 
27 third parties who may be dealing in the same property. Id at 196. 
28 In this case, the Affidavit <l Aaron J. Tribble filed August 8, 2014, contains the facts that 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 23 -
form the basis a quiet title claim, some of which were uncovered in the discovery process. 
2 Three particular facts point towards CBH having inquiry notice. 
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the relating to the EEF deed of trust were recorded in an 
Ordinarily, partial reconveyances are recorded prior to any full reconveyance because after the 
recording of a full reconveyance, there is no interest left to convey. In this case, the Ada County 
records show that there were two partial reconveyances followed by TitleOne's full reconveyance 
followed months later by a couple more partial reconveyances. Once a full reconveyance has 
been executed, there is no longer any interest left to reconvey, thus a partial reconveyance 
occurring after a full reconveyance indicates a potential problem in the chain of title. Either the 
people doing the partial reconveyances were confused about the state of their property interest, or 
the full reconveyance was recorded in error. Either way, facts as they appear in the Ada County 
records indicate that some kind of inquiry is necessary to discern what went wrong. Both CBH 
and their predecessor DAS has access to the same county records and therefore were on inquiry 
notice of EEF' s lien. 
Second, the full reconveyance was not signed and recorded by the Trustee of Record or 
anyone having a property interest in the Galiano Subdivision. The basis of title in property is the 
chain of title. Interests in property are handed from a grantor to a grantee, and the grantors title is 
traceable back through a chain of grantors and grantees. If a grantor conveys without being a part 
of the chain of title, the conveyance is voidable. In this case, the Ada County records show that 
TitleOne reconveyed the EEF deed of trust. However. the Ada County Records also clearly show 
that TitleOne was never a trustee on the EEF deed of trust, so TitleOne was not in the chain of 
title for this property. This is a major red flag to any potential buyer examining the records, 
because TitleOne had no property interest to reconvey. TitleOne was not in the chain of title. 
Certainly, this would warrant an inquiry by CBH and DAS into TitleOne's status as trustee. 
Third, TitleOne on the face of the reconveyance claims to actually be the Trustee, but the 
records at the time show the exact opposite. Not only was TitleOne absent from the chain of title, 
but they actually claimed to be in the chain of title in the reconveyance document. By claiming 
status as trustee when the records clearly show they are not, TitleOne created another reason for 
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inquiry into the reconveyance recorded in February 20 l 0. 
2 Any inquiry into the basis of the reconveyance document would have shown that the 
was a sham; a bad at best As Affidavit of Aaron J. Tribble 
4 TitleOne admitted in deposition that it was never trustee, and TitleOne had no evidence of 
5 payment in full. Therefore, any inquiry by CBH and DAS would have put a buyer on notice of 
6 EEFs active lien because the county records, and their contents, suggest that an inquiry is 
7 necessary to resolve questions about (I) chain of title, (2) the false information in the 
8 reconveyance, and (3) the suspicious order of the recordings. Therefore, a claim of quiet title 
9 would likely succeed against Corey Barton because they had inquiry notice of EEF's lien prior to 
IO taking title. 
11 B. The District Court Had No Basis To Deny The Inclusion Of A Meritorious 
12 Claim 
13 The District Court abused its discretion in denying EEF's Motion to Amend. When 
I 4 determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court asks: "( l) whether the court 
15 correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether it acted within the outer boundaries 
16 of that discretion and consistently with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether it reached 
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its decision by an of reason." Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230, 232, 953 P.2d 980, 982 
(1998) (internal citations omitted). A detailed examination of IRCP I 5(a) was set forth by the 
Court in Carl H. Christensen Family Trust: 
The twin purposes behind the rule are to allow claims to be 
determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make 
pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of 
the claim and the facts at issue. 
It is within the district court's sound discretion to decide whether to 
allow a party to amend its complaint after a responsive pleading has 
been served. 11 [l]n the interest of justice, district courts should favor 
liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint. 11 
Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871 
( 1999) (internal citations omitted). 
Factors that this Court considers when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a motion 
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to amend include: l) if the amended pleading provides a valid claim; 2) if the opposing party 
would be prejudiced the delay in adding the new claim; and 3) if the opposing party has an 
defense as statute of Black Canyon Racquetball Cf uh, . v. Idaho 
4 First Nat'! Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 175 (1991). If the opposing party has such a defense, it is not an 
5 abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the amended complaint Id. 
6 In this case, EEF sought to amend the complaint to include a claim for quiet title against 
7 CBH, the current titleholder. In that motion, EEF requested that the District Court find that CBH, 
8 and their predecessor DAS, had inquiry notice of EEF's deed of trust and declare EEF's deed of 
9 trust to be valid and have priority against any other subsequent liens on the property. At issue in 
10 the motion was only one of the factors described in Black Canyon Raquetball Club. CBH simply 
11 opposed the Motion to Amend based on the validity of the claim due to lack of inquiry notice. 
12 CBH raised no potential defenses and cited no prejudice. 
13 As was discussed above, the District Court concluded that there was no inquiry notice; not 
14 even a factual issue of inquiry notice. The District Court simply disallowed the Motion to Amend 
15 because it did not believe that there was any validity to the claim. As was shown above, the 
16 District Court erred in finding there was no inquiry notice to CBH or DAS However, CBH 
17 and DAS were on inquiry notice of EEF' s deed of trust The Court should hold that it \Vas an 
18 abuse of discretion to deny amendment based on the District Court's error concerning inquiry 
19 notice. This Court should reverse the District Court" s holding on inquiry notice and order an 
20 amendment to the pleadings to allow the inclusion of a quiet title claim. 
21 CONCLUSION 
22 In this case, the District Court committed errors of law that have deprived EEF of its right 
23 to a jury trial. First among these errors is the dismissal of EEF' s claim for common law 
24 negligence against TitleOne. The economic loss doctrine is not bar for damages flowing from 
25 this type of negligence. TitleOne is in the service business, the business of creating and filing 
26 title documents. Their negligent rendition of services directly damaged EEF' s interest in the 
27 Galiano property. And TitleOne certainly owed EEF a general duty of care to not harm EEF's 
28 property interest As such, economic loss doctrine does not lie in this situation. The Court should 
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reverse the District Court's holding concerning the economic loss doctrine. 
The District Court erred in concluding that there was no damage suffered in EEF' s claims 
for Violation of J.C. § 45-1205 and TIPEA against TitleOne. In this case, EEF lost its right to 
notice, which was a right to participate in the short sale. Consequently, EEF was deprived of its 
opportunity protect its security interest and to capture any of the over $250,000 profit that DAS 
immediately realized. There was money to be made on this property. DAS made it. EEF wasn't 
given the chance. In fact, the District Court drew the inference of value against EEF in 
contravention of the summary judgment standards. The Court should reverse this erroneous 
holding concerning the issue of damages. 
The District Court also misapplied the statute of limitations on EEF's statutory negligence 
claim for two alternate reasons. First, the District Court held that the cause of action accrued 
almost two years earlier than it should have. Indeed, EEF did not truly suffer any damage until 
the property was transferred to a BFP. Should the property records not be found to give inquiry 
notice of a title flaw, then damage was suffered once DAS took title to the Galiano property. 
Alternatively, the District Court should not have used the 3-year limitation period reserved for 
purely statutory liabilities. The Court should either reverse the District Court's error of accrual 
date or reverse the District Court by applying the correct 4 or 20-year statute of limitations. 
Finally, the District Court abused its discretion by denying the inclusion of a meritorious 
claim for quiet title against Corey Barton Hornes, Inc.. The Ada County property records very 
clearly show that TitleOne was never the trustee of EEF' s Deed of Trust. Yet, those records show 
that TitleOne falsely claimed to be trustee and then reconveyed EEF's interest. The records also 
show that EEF was unaware of what TitleOne had done because EEF was still recording partial 
reconveyances even after TitleOne had already reconveyed the whole interest. These defects in 
title clearly warrant inquiry, and any inquiry would have revealed that EEF was never satisfied. 
Thus, DAS and CBH cannot be bona fide purchasers of that property because they were on 
inquiry notice of TitleOne' s negligent or intentional false reconveyance. The Court should 
reverse the District Court and hold it to be an abuse of discretion to not allow the inclusion of this 
meritorious claim for quiet title. 
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